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Abstract
This paper examines the issues regarding the cross-border resolution of financial institutions, focusing on the
power allocation between the home and host resolution authorities, i.e. the jurisdiction rule. The research is
conducted from the international insolvency law perspective. A modified universalism approach is chosen, taken
into account the balance of conflict of interests between effective resolution and protection of local interests.
Regarding the parent-branch resolution, the home authority should be able to commence a main resolution
proceeding, while the host authority should be able to commence either a supportive secondary resolution
proceeding or an independent secondary resolution proceeding. Regarding the parent-subsidiary resolution, in
spite of the desire to take a global resolution action, the current legal framework only allows a host resolution
proceeding for foreign subsidiaries. This paper continues to propose the application of the head office functions
test developed in the international insolvency law, so that foreign subsidiaries can be subject to the home main
resolution proceeding.
Key Words: Cross-border Resolution; Financial Institutions; International Insolvency Law; Modified
Universalism
1. Introduction
The financial crisis witnessed the incompleteness of a domestic orderly resolution regime for financial
institutions as well as a lack of effective international cooperation mechanism for cross-border issues. 1
Against this background, world leaders called for the development of ‘resolution tools and frameworks
for the effective resolution of financial groups to help mitigate the disruption of financial institution
failures and reduce moral hazard in future’, inter alia, ‘crisis management groups for the major cross-
border firms.’ 2  Various jurisdictions took legal reforms towards a new resolution regime, empowering the
administrative resolution authorities to take administrative intervention measures with the aim to orderly
resolve ailing financial institutions. In the United State (US), the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) 3  put systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) into
the resolution regime. In the European Union (EU), bank resolution laws have been largely harmonized
across the Member States subsequent to the enactment of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD), 4  and a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has been established in accordance with the Single
Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR), 5  empowering the Single Resolution Board (SRB) to address
bank resolution issues within the Banking Union.
Efforts have also been made at the international level. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
under the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) developed 10 recommendations for the cross-border bank
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resolution. 6  And the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed an enhanced coordination framework
for resolution of cross-border banks. 7  In addition, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published the Key
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (Key Attributes, or KAs) in 2011,
and soon updated it in 2014, on the one hand to formulate standards for harmonising resolution legislation
at the national level, on the other hand to address cross-border resolution issues. 8  The FSB proposals
on cross-border resolution of financial institutions include general cooperation framework (KA 7), Crisis
Management Groups (CMGs) (KA 8), and institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements (KA
9). In a following document, the FSB further set out principles regarding three measures for cross-border
effectiveness of resolution actions: statutory recognition, statutory supportive measures and contractual
recognition. 9  These proposals help enhance the cooperation among home and host authorities.
What is missing in these proposals, however, is a clear jurisdiction rule on the power allocation between
home and host resolution authorities, which may become an obstacle for an effective global resolution.
According the lasted FSB report, cross-border resolution is still one of the major problems faced by the
global resolution regime even after ten years since the financial crisis. 10  Unfortunately, national practices
even show opposite approaches towards the jurisdiction rule. For example, branches of foreign banks
are subject to the host US resolution authority, but in the EU, they are subject to the home resolution
authority. Opposite approaches would lead to either overlap or vacuum authority over a foreign branch.
This reflects the traditional conflict between territorialism principle and universalism principle in the field of
international corporate insolvency law. To solve this conflict, a modified universalism model has been widely
acknowledged to address international corporate insolvency issues at the global level. Financial institutions,
however, are generally excluded from corporate insolvency legal systems, so are the cross-border resolution
measures.
In this paper, research is conducted on the applicability of international corporate insolvency law principles
on the cross-border resolution issues. In particular, the focus of the research is on the jurisdiction rule, with
the purpose to examine the power allocation between home and host resolution authorities. As explained
by Mevorach, the cross-border resolution needs to move forward from the existing ‘international best
practices approach’, as those prescribed in the FSB Key Attributes, to a more formal legal framework
from the ‘private international aspects’, as what the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) did in the field of international corporate insolvency law through the instrument
UNCITRAL Model Law for Cross-border Insolvency (UNCITRAL Model Law), though she did not
actually propose a concrete framework. 11  This paper tries to fill the gap, and it is believed that setting
the jurisdiction rule would help determine the applicable law and facilitate cross-border recognition and
ultimately achieve an effective resolution outcome at the global level.
‘Resolution’ in this paper refers to administrative measures initiated by the resolution authorities to resolve
ailing financial institutions. ‘Insolvency’ is an umbrella term encompassing all the measures aimed at
resolving ailing entities. Resolution is thus considered to be part of the overall ‘insolvency’ regime as a special
mechanism to address financial institutions in distress, but distinct from traditional ‘corporate insolvency’
proceedings such as reorganisation and liquidation. Resolution is different from ‘supervision’, as in the
resolution process, the rights and obligations of and shareholders and creditors are invaded on a justifiable
basis, conversely, the supervision is mainly targeted at the institution and its management without actually
interfering with the shareholders' and creditors' rights.
A critical issue that needs to be clarified is the difference between branches and subsidiaries. As defined by
the BCBS, branches are ‘operating entities which do not have a separate legal status and are thus integral
parts of the foreign parent bank’; while subsidiaries are ‘legally independent institutions, wholly-owned
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or majority-owned, by a bank which is incorporated in a country other than that of the subsidiary.’ 12
Collectively, they are referred to as ‘foreign establishments’. From a legal point of view, the major difference
between these two types of entities is that branches are part of the parent company while the subsidiaries
are independent legal entities. A distinction is thus made in this paper with regard to different resolution
strategies towards foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries.
In the following Chapter 2, a general description of international corporate insolvency law is provided,
laying down the theoretical foundation for further analysis. Chapter 3 discusses the lex specialis for
cross-border bank insolvency, shifting the centre of main Interests (COMI)/establishment conflict in the
corporate insolvency law to the home/host conflict in the bank insolvency law. Chapter 4, by analysing
the conflicts of interest in cross-border resolution, proposes a modified universalism approach towards the
resolution of multinational institutions. Regarding the parent-branch case, the home authority can open
a main resolution proceeding while the host authority can open a secondary resolution proceeding, either
a supportive one or an independent one. With regard to the parent-subsidiary group structure, Chapter 5
further discusses the need for a group resolution action and analyses the insufficient international practices
on extending home authority's powers to foreign subsidiaries. It is then proposed to apply the head office
functions test developed in the international corporate insolvency law to the cross-border resolution cases,
enabling foreign subsidiaries to be subject to the home resolution proceedings. The final conclusion is drawn
in Chapter 6.
2. International Insolvency Law: The Jurisdiction Rule
2.1. Theoretical debate: territorialism v. universalism
In this Chapter, the general theoretical debate and legal practices of international corporate insolvency law
are introduced. To begin with, two competing theories are illustrated, i.e. territorialism v. universalism.
These two principles address the issue of the extraterritorial effect of the insolvency proceedings.
Territorialism, or territoriality, refers to the practice that ‘the respective measures will only have legal effects
within the jurisdiction of the State in which a court has opened insolvency proceedings’. 13  It was applied
in history during the Roman Empire and the later Middle Ages, when the states adopted territorialism
by simply ignoring the assets located outside the territory, as a result of the largely unified rules over all
assets and parties in insolvency matters due to the existence of the ius civilis and the lex mercatoria. 14
However, with the increase of global trade and the expansion of multinational enterprises, a territorial
approach became less effective given the fact that a large amount of assets of the debtor may be located in
foreign countries, which impeded the effectiveness of insolvency and the allocation of the assets to (domestic)
creditors. 15  Also, foreign creditors were more actively involved in insolvency proceedings and asked for the
protection of local insolvency law and being treated like domestic creditors. An example was the early 16 th
century Antwerp, and at that time, the foreign merchants demanded from the Town Fathers the enactment
of a bankruptcy law for their protection. 16  In such sense, a more global perspective was needed to address
increasing cross-border insolvencies.
Contrary to the territorialism approach, universalism adopts a worldwide perspective, in which ‘the (sole)
insolvency proceedings ‘have global scope’ and are ‘aimed at encompassing all the debtor's assets’. 17
Against the backdrop of globalisation, the global market needs a symmetrical global solution which
connects all the assets and interest around the world and solves the default universally. 18  However, the
effectiveness of this approach depends on the attitude of the counterparty jurisdiction because a jurisdiction
can choose whether to accept the effects of foreign proceedings within its own territory. 19  Application of
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universalism requires a close cooperation among different jurisdictions. Unfortunately, certain practical
obstacles remain as some jurisdictions are reluctant to enforce foreign bankruptcy proceedings, especially
when against local interests. 20  A radical opinion even holds that unadulterated universality is a ‘theoretical
illusion’, as there are always exceptions for one coordinated proceeding such as ancillary proceeding abroad
or protectionist rules on conflicts of laws. 21
To address the incompetence of these two extreme approaches, more theories are designed or proposed
to solve cross-border insolvency problems, such as cooperative territoriality, 22  virtual territoriality, 23
multilateralism, 24  contractualism, 25  and universal proceduralism. 26  These theories are modifications
on the basis of territorialism or universalism. In practice, many jurisdictions would not adopt complete
territorialism or universalism, rather would follow a “middle way”, towards the universalism end. 27  A
‘modified universalism’ or ‘modified universality’ approach 28  has been widely applied across the world,
under the different names such as ‘mitigated universality’, 29  ‘coordinated universality’ 30  or ‘limited,
curtailed or controlled universalism’. 31
2.2. Modified universalism: main and secondary proceedings
With regard to the modified universalism, two instruments are introduced and compared in this paper, i.e.
the UNICTRAL Modal Law and the EU Insolvency Regulation (EIR). A main common feature of these
two instruments is the co-existence of main and secondary (non-main) insolvency proceedings, which is the
manifestation of the modified universalism principle.
The UNCITRAL has been working on several projects promoting international trade, including
harmonisation of insolvency law. 32  One significant achievement of the UNICTRAL Insolvency Working
group V is the UNICTRAL Model law on Cross-border Insolvency in 1997 and its accompanying document
the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency in
2013 (UNCITRAL Model Law Guide). 33  The Model Law needs to be transposed into national legislation
to be effective. For instance, the US incorporates the Model Law provisions into the US Bankruptcy Code
Chapter 15 ‘Ancillary and other Cross-border Cases’. 34  As of November 2017, the Model Law has been
adopted in 43 States in a total of 45 jurisdictions, 35  and has effectively helped promote the cooperation
of different jurisdictions on cross-border insolvency. Empirical research shows that 95% of the recognition
requests were granted in jurisdictions adopting the Model Law, including the UK, the US, Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Mexico, Japan and Korea as of 2011. 36
In terms of the specific legal rules, the UNCITRAL Model Law does not directly address the jurisdiction
issue. As explained in the UNCITRAL Model Law Guide, the presumption of the UNCITRAL Model
Law is to ‘facilitate the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and the provision of assistance to
those proceedings’, thus it does not cover rules for the proper place for commencement of insolvency
proceedings. 37  However, the Model Law does make the distinction between main and non-main
proceedings. ‘Foreign main proceeding’ in the UNCITRAL Model Law is defined as ‘a foreign proceeding
taking place in the State where the debtor has the centre of its main interests’, 38  and ‘foreign non-main
proceeding’ means ‘a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, taking place in a State where
the debtor has an establishment.’ 39  Also, ‘establishment’ is referred to as ‘any place of operations where the
debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods or services’. 40  Albeit
without a clear definition, Article 16(3) of the Model Law provides certain criteria for the determination of
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centre of main interests (COMI): ‘in the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor's registered office, or
habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the centre of the debtor's main interests’. 41
Based on the distinction of main and non-main proceedings, the UNCITRAL Model Law further provides
rules on access to local courts, recognition of foreign orders, relief to assist foreign proceedings, cooperation
among courts and coordination of concurrent proceedings. 42
The UNCITRAL Model law was formulated in 1997 and at that time consensus can only be achieved in
limited areas, thus it provided limited guidance of cross-border insolvency, and left certain issues such as
jurisdiction and applicable law unregulated. 43  The contribution of the UNCITRAL Model Law, however,
is more about conveying an idea to the world that one main proceeding can exist with worldwide legal effect
while local non-main proceedings can have limited legal effects within the territory. 44
In the EU, the attempt to create a European legal instrument regulating cross-border insolvency has been
undergoing since 1960, such as the draft treaties 1970 and 1980, Treaty of Istanbul 1990 and EU Convention
1995. 45  But it is until 2000 that a final version of EU Insolvency Regulation (EIR 2000) eventually came
into force, 46  with the aim of establishing efficient and effective cross-border insolvency proceedings for the
proper functioning of the internal market. 47  In spite of the desire to establish a single universal proceeding
effective across the EU, 48  it is admitted that the ‘widely differing substantive laws’ cannot be overcome in
the Union 49  and thus the EIR 2000 chose the modified universalism approach, allowing the co-existence
of main and secondary proceedings, similar to the main/non-main proceedings in the UNCITRAL Model
Law, with the same distinction between ‘COMI’ and ‘establishment’. 50  In accordance with Article 46 of
the EIR 2000, the regulation was supposed to be reviewed no later than 1 June 2012. 51  The EIR 2000
was further amended in 2015 (EIR 2015 Recast) and entered into force on 26 June 2017. 52  In succession
to the 2000 version, the EIR 2015 recast still adopts the modified universalism principle as a result of the
unchanged widely differing substantive laws. 53
Unlike the above mentioned UNCITRAL Model Law, the EIR covers various issues regarding cross-border
corporate insolvency, including international jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition issues. 54  Article
3 of the EIR 2015 Recast establishes rules for international jurisdiction. The jurisdiction where the COMI
is situated can open main insolvency proceeding, while other jurisdictions with presence of the debtor's
establishment can open secondary proceedings. 55  The main insolvency proceedings ‘have universal scope
and are aimed at encompassing all the debtor's assets’, while the effects of secondary insolvency proceedings
are limited to the assets located in the jurisdiction where local establishments situated. 56  The opening of
secondary insolvency proceedings may serve different purposes, such as ‘protection of local interests’, or in
the cases ‘the insolvency estate of the debtor is too complex to administer as a unit’, or ‘the differences in the
legal systems concerned are so great that difficulties may arise from the extension of effects deriving from the
law of the State of the opening of proceedings to the other Member States where the assets are located.’ 57
It is generally believed that a branch can constitute as an ‘establishment’, thus the jurisdiction where the
branch is situated can open a secondary insolvency proceeding while the jurisdiction where the parent is
situated enters into main insolvency proceeding. In contrast, parent-subsidiary structure is controversial.
Discussion is provided below on group insolvency issues.
2.3. Group insolvency issues
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An enterprise group covers both the parent and subsidiaries. Unlike branches, subsidiaries are entities
with independent legal status. Thus, it is traditionally held that the insolvency of a subsidiary should be
administered by the competent authority in the jurisdiction where the subsidiary is incorporated, regardless
of the insolvency proceeding of the parent company. 58  Both the UNCITRAL Model Law and EIR
2000 do not provide rules for group insolvency. The Virgós-Schmit Report 59  explicitly stated that the
EU Insolvency Regulation that the EIR 2000 ‘offers no rule for groups of affiliated companies (parent-
subsidiary schemes)’, 60  and it was stated that
The general rule to open or to consolidate insolvency proceedings against any of the related
companies as a principle or jointly liable debtor is that jurisdiction must exist … for each of
the concerned debtors with a separate legal entity. 61
Nevertheless, a subsidiary should not be treated as a normal independent legal entity because of the close
connection between the parent company and its subsidiaries. In addition to the UNCITRAL Model Law,
UNCITRAL had made several other attempts towards a harmonised international insolvency framework,
including the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (UNCITRAL Legislative Guide), with its
part three on the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency (2010). 62  As identified by the UNCITRAL,
group structure is common for multinational enterprises, with various advantages such as reduction of
commercial risk and maximization of financial return. 63  On the regulation aspect, traditionally a subsidiary
is treated as a separate entity (separate entity approach), but increasingly there are national practices treating
parent-subsidiary as a single enterprise (single enterprise approach). 64
The UNCITRAL proposed two approaches towards domestic group insolvency: procedural coordination
and substantive consolidation. ‘Procedural coordination’ refers to ‘coordination of the administration of
two or more insolvency proceedings in respect of enterprise group members. Each of those members,
including its assets and liabilities, remains separate and distinct’. It is pointed out that, ‘[a]lthough
administered in a coordinated manner, the assets and liabilities of each group member involved in the
procedural coordination remain separate and distinct, thus preserving the integrity and identity of individual
group members and the substantive rights of claimants.’ 65  In other words, such kind of coordination is
based on the separate entity approach. On the contrary, ‘substantive consolidation’ refers to ‘the treatment
of the assets and liabilities of two or more enterprise group members as if they were part of a single
insolvency estate.’ 66  It is also further explained that it ‘permits the court, in insolvency proceedings
involving two or more enterprise group members, to disregard the separate identity of each group member
in appropriate circumstances and consolidate their assets and liabilities, treating them as though held and
incurred by a single entity’. 67  Through substantive consolidation, several individual insolvency proceedings
are combined into one proceeding.
The UNCITRAL further proposed solutions for cross-border group insolvency, including applying COMI
to an enterprise group, or identifying a coordination centre for the group. 68  The first solution is similar
to substantive consolidation, allowing only one main insolvency proceeding; while the second solution is
one type of procedural coordination, allowing the co-existence of concurrent proceedings of several parent/
subsidiaries entities.
The second solution of the UNCITRAL on procedural coordination is now regulated in the EIR 2015
Recast Chapter V ‘insolvency proceedings of members of a group of companies’. 69  ‘Group of companies’
mean ‘a parent undertaking and all its subsidiary undertakings’. 70  A major drawback of this procedural
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coordination mechanism is the missing of the jurisdiction rule. 71  Instead, focus is only on the coordination
among several concurrent insolvency proceedings, which can be integrated into one group coordination
proceeding. The competent court to open a group coordination proceeding is the court first seized the
request to open a group coordination proceeding, as the ‘priority rule’, 72  except that if more than 2/3 of
the Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) disagree, they may jointly decide on a court with exclusive jurisdiction. 73
After the opening of a group coordination proceeding, a coordinator is appointed to coordinate the
group insolvency proceedings in different jurisdictions, who is not supposed to be any of the insolvency
practitioners in the already opened insolvency proceedings and shall have no conflict of interest. 74  The
coordinator is supposed to identify and outline recommendations and propose a group coordination plan
targeting all the group members. 75  The successful execution of such group coordination plan equals to the
consolidation of separate proceedings. 76  However, this mechanism may not be as effective as it seems, since
there are no legal obligations for IPs to follow the recommendations or group coordination plan. 77
The first solution proposed by the UNCITRAL, applying COMI to a group enterprise, albeit without a
clear provision, is also acknowledged in the EIR Recast 2015 Recital, stating that
The introduction of rules on the insolvency proceedings of groups of companies should not
limit the possibility for a court to open insolvency proceedings for several companies belonging
to the same group in a single jurisdiction if the court finds that the centre of main interests of
those companies is located in a single Member State. 78
This means that, under certain circumstances, the COMI of a subsidiary can be the jurisdiction of its parent
company rather than where it is incorporated, thus the subsidiary is also subject to the same main insolvency
proceeding as its parent company. It has also been confirmed in several European cases before. More
discussion is provided below in Chapter 5.
3. Lex Specialis for Cross-border Insolvency of Financial Institutions
Special insolvency regime is tailored to the financial institutions. In some jurisdictions, financial institutions
are excluded from the general corporate insolvency rules. For instance, the US Bankruptcy Code excludes
financial institutions from eligible debtors, 79  especially foreign insurance companies as well as foreign
banks and other types of credit institutions. 80  Banks specifically are subject to the special receivership or
conservatorship regime implemented by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 81  In other
jurisdictions like Austria, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, certain special arrangements also exist in
the national corporate insolvency laws such as the possibility to commence an insolvency proceeding by a
competent administrative authority rather than the debtor or the creditors. 82
The separation of financial institution insolvency from general corporate insolvency legal framework is
justified by the nature and characteristics of financial institutions and the severe consequences an insolvent
financial institution may incur on the society. The banking industry provides an exemplary explanation for
such different treatment. Banks, as major financial market participants, take an intermediate role between
the depositors and borrowers. 83  Different from normal companies, banks usually hold ‘highly liquid
liabilities in the form of deposits’ and ‘long-term loans that may be difficult to sell or borrow against on short
notice’, thus during crisis time, massive withdrawals of deposit would cause liquidity problems for banks. 84
In addition, the deposit-taker characteristic distinguishes banks from other institutions, in the sense that
deposits are part of the payment system and the failure of a large bank might cause disruption to the whole
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payment system. 85  And due to the interconnectedness of banks as a result of central clearing and settlement
transactions, a failure of one bank might cause payment problems in other banks and thus exposes these
banks to the systemic risks, which is commonly known as contagion effects. 86  These characteristics provide
incentives for authorities to treat banks differently to avoid the severe disruption to the overall financial
system and the stability of the whole society.
Lex Specialis is not limited to the domestic substantive insolvency rules for financial institutions, but also
exits in the cross-border context. This is the case of the EIR in which financial institutions are excluded. 87
The Virgós-Schmit Report explained from the legal and regulatory point of view,
Contracting States subject these entities to prudential supervision through national regulatory
authorities in order to minimize the risk to the relevant industries and to the financial system
as a whole. All these entities are subject to specific Community regulations in the exercise of
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, which are founded on the principle
of control by the authorities of the State of origin of the entity in question. 88
In the meanwhile, two Directives were negotiated and later came into force on special cross-border
insolvency regimes for insurance companies and banks — Directive 2001/17/EC on the reorganisation and
winding up of insurance undertaking (IWUD) 89  and Directive 2001/24/EC on the reorganisation and
winding up of credit institutions (CIWUD). 90  A similar unity and universalism approach was chosen in
these two Directives. 91  The following part takes the CIWUD as an example to illustrate such a choice.
During the drafting process, there was an opinion that the CIWUD should allow the host jurisdiction to
open a secondary proceeding, just as the mechanism provided for in the EIR. 92  However, the CIWUD
ultimately abandoned modified universalism principle and adopted the unity and universalism approach,
prescribing that there is only one insolvency proceeding in the home jurisdiction (unity), and it shall
have universal effects across the Member States (universalism). 93  It is emphasized in the CIWUD that
the ‘administrative and judicial authorities of the home Member State shall alone be empowered to
decide on the implementation of one or more reorganisation measures in a credit institution, including
branches established in other Member States.’ 94  In addition, the reorganisation measures ‘shall be effective
throughout the Community once they become effective in the Member States where they have been
taken’. 95  Similar provisions also apply to the winding-up proceedings. 96  Here, home Member State is
defined as ‘the Member State in which an institution has been granted authorisation’, 97  and host Member
State is defined as ‘the Member State in which an institution has a branch or in which it provides services’. 98
Accordingly, the CIWUD excludes the possibility of opening a secondary proceeding in the host branch
jurisdiction. 99  Unfortunately, the CIWUD does not mention insolvency of parent-subsidiary group.
It is also worth noting that the resolution measures have been integrated into the CIWUD. 100  Article
117 BRRD amended several provisions in the CIWUD, and in accordance with the new amendment, ‘in
the event of application of resolution tools and exercise of the resolution powers provided for [BRRD],
[CIWUD] shall also apply to the financial institutions, firms and parent undertakings falling within the
scope of [BRRD].’ 101  In addition, the ‘reorganisation measures’ in the CIWUD have been redefined as
those measures ‘which are intended to preserve or restore the financial situation of a credit institution or
an investment firm’ and ‘could affect third parties’ pre-existing rights, including measures involving the
possibility of a suspension of payments, suspension of enforcement measures or reduction of claims; those
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measures include the application of the resolution tools and the exercise of resolution powers provided for
in [BRRD]’. 102  It is expected in the parent-branch case, the home resolution authority has control over the
foreign branches in the EU and can implement resolution powers on those foreign branches.
One shift from the EIR to the CIWUD is the usage of home-host relationship instead of COMI-
establishment elements. This is due to the fact that the financial activities are under supervision of
the financial supervisors, who are main actors involved in the financial institution insolvency. In the
following discussion of cross-border resolution cases, the main actors are resolution authorities, sharing the
administrative nature with supervisory authorities and such shift to the home/host relationship still remains.
The underlying rationale behind such shift is well explained by the Underpinnings Contact Group:
The principles of home country control, minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition —
forming the core of the market integration principles for financial markets — have also been
transposed in the field of insolvency procedures and constitute the basis of the Winding-up
Directive for insurance undertakings and the Winding-up Directive for credit institutions.
In particular, the home country and mutual recognition principles — being introduced by
the First and Second Banking Co-ordination Directives, respectively — are extended to the
insolvency of credit institutions. 103
…
Credit institutions and insurance undertakings are instead subject to the two sectoral Winding-
up Directives, taking into account that national supervisory authorities may have wide-ranging
powers of investigation in relation to such entities. 104
Here mentions the First and Second Banking Co-ordination Directives, 105  which represent the attempt of
the EU to form harmonised rules for banking industry supervision. 106  This harmonisation process helps
explain the second shift from the EIR to the CIWUD as the abandonment of modified universalism and
adoption of unity and universalism as introduced above. As pointed out by the Underpinnings Contact
Group, the unity and universalism approach is based on, particularly, home country control and mutual
recognition. These principles embedded in the two Banking Directives have been incorporated into the
amendments of the Banking Directives — Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) 107  and Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 (CRR). 108  As prescribed in the latest legislation, ‘[r]esponsibility for supervising the financial
soundness of a credit institution and in particular its solvency on a consolidated basis should lie with its home
Member State.’ 109  It is confirmed in the CIWUD recital that ‘a credit institution and its branches form a
single entity subject to the supervision of the competent authorities of the State where authorisation valid
throughout the Community was granted’, 110  and it would be ‘particularly undesirable to relinquish such
unity’. 111  The successful implementation of such approach is also accompanied by automatic recognition
among the EU Member States and no exception for any public policy. 112  As indicated in the CIWUD
recital, ‘[o]wing to the difficulty of harmonising Member States' laws and practices, it is necessary to establish
mutual recognition by the Member States of the measures taken by each of them to restore to viability the
credit institutions which it has authorised.’ 113
The adoption of the unity and universalism approach towards cross-border financial institution insolvency
in the EU is closely linked to its achievement in harmonising national supervision laws, although this
approach was criticized on the basis of lack of sufficient ground. 114  Unfortunately, at the global level,
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it might be less likely to extend such unity and universalism approach to the other jurisdictions since
there clearly lacks a harmonized supervision law. Despite the continuous efforts of the international
organisations, conflicts of interest still remain across jurisdictions. Further analysis is conducted below.
4. Modified Universalism for Cross-border Resolution
4.1. Conflict of Interests between home and host jurisdictions
4.1.1. Pre-crisis bank insolvency and national bailout
As mentioned above, the conflict of territorialism and universalism stems from the conflict of interest among
the different jurisdictions, and the choice of modified universalism is to balance the different interests. The
main insolvency proceedings are supposed to ‘have universal scope and aimed at encompassing all the
debtor's assets’, while the opening of secondary proceedings aims to ‘protect the diversity of interest’, 115
such as differences of the laws on security interests and the preferential rights enjoyed by some creditors. 116
In the cross-border bank insolvency cases, conflicts of interests also exist between home and host
jurisdictions, not only with regard to the legal conflicts as those in the insolvency law, but also conflicts
related to the national interests, inter alia, financial stability. Although within the EU, as discussed in
Chapter 3, such conflicts have been mitigated due to the harmonisation of national financial regulations, in
the other parts of the world, such conflicts are still a major problem. In the pre-crisis era, approaches towards
solving ailing financial institutions, especially non-bank financial institutions, were limited to traditional
insolvency instruments and national bailout. 117  The discussion below starts with the conflicts in these two
instruments, and then extends to the conflicts in resolution. Unless specified, the analysis applies to both
branches and subsidiaries.
The conflicts concerning traditional insolvency regimes are mainly attributed to the ‘regulatory
asymmetries’ in bank insolvency approaches, 118  as pre-crisis bank insolvency mechanisms were fragmented
across the world. 119  This is similar to the general legal conflicts in the corporate insolvency law. A major
goal of insolvency law is to protect the creditors' interest. As a result, national authorities would like to
grab as much assets as they can to meet the needs of their nationals in the way prescribed in their national
laws. 120  In such sense, the host jurisdictions would prefer a territorial approach, by ring-fencing the assets
located in their jurisdictions to satisfy the local creditors first. 121
The ring-fencing approach is embodied in the US legislation regarding foreign bank branches. 122  In
general, the cross-border insolvency issues are regulated in the US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 15 which
adopts the modified universalism as the UNCITRAL Model Law, however, foreign bank branches are
excluded from Chapter 15 123  and regulated through separate legal provisions. 124  There are three types
of foreign branches in the US: FDIC insured foreign branch, 125  uninsured federal foreign branch, and
uninsured state foreign branch, all of which are subject to the local legislation in the US. FDIC insured
branches are resolved by the FDIC under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). 126  Uninsured federal
foreign branches are regulated under the International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA). As prescribed in the
Sections 4(i) and (j) IBA, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the national supervisor,
may revoke the authority of the branch or appoint a receiver ‘who shall take possession of all the property
and assets of such foreign bank in the United States and exercise the same rights, privileges, powers,
and authority with respect thereto as are now exercised by receivers of national banks appointed by the
Comptroller’. 127  Regarding uninsured state foreign branches, taking New York State as an example,
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the superintendent of the Department of Financial Services (Superintendent) may take similar measures
prescribed in the IBA. 128  These rules remain effective after the financial crisis even though the US adopted
new rules for domestic entities including subsidiaries of foreign banking organisations (FBOs). 129
While in the context of national bailout, when government funding is needed, home jurisdiction would
prefer a territorial approach by limiting the national bailout within its territory. As explained by economists
through the ‘prisoner's dilemma’ game theory, home authorities lack incentives to cooperate with host
authorities in the bailout mechanism. 130  The Fortis case demonstrated the national preference in the
bailout, in which case Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg took individual measures rather than
cooperation. 131  This situation also happens in other forms of national funding such as the deposit
guarantee schemes. This is the case in the insolvency of the several Icelandic banks, in which the Icelandic
authority declined to cover the foreign deposits in the branches located in the UK and Netherlands, for
fear of national sovereign default. 132  The dilemma is even worse in such case of a small home jurisdiction,
where the national authority has limited capacity and resources and cannot cover the branches overseas. On
the contrary, some host institutions might wish to be covered in the home jurisdiction regime. As mentioned
above, some foreign branches in the US are not insured by the FDIC and thus cannot be protected under
the insurance scheme, thus these branches can only turn to home authorities for bailout. Particularly, small
host jurisdictions would like to take advantage of large home jurisdictions which can provide more national
funding. 133
4.1.2. Post-crisis resolution
Uncooperative national bank insolvency and bailout practices led to the disorderly resolution of
international financial institutions. Against this backdrop, the resolution mechanism was promoted to
address the financial crisis. The objective of resolution is to ‘make feasible the resolution of financial
institutions without severe systemic disruption and without exposing taxpayers to loss, while protecting
vital economic functions’. 134  In other words, resolution aims to protect financial stability without causing
systemic risks. 135  Three main paradigm shifts were identified by Haentjens and Wessels, namely, from
individual to public interest, from judicial to government authorities control, and from national regulation
to European harmonisation and unification. 136  Albeit more embedded in the European context, these shifts
do apply across the world. The paradigm shifts help ease the conflicts mentioned above.
First, the new resolution mechanism subordinates private rights to the public interest, such as the bail-in
tool and temporary stay on early termination rights. Bail-in tool empowers the resolution authorities to
fully or partly write down equity or creditors' claims or convert creditors' claims into equity. 137  The losses
are supposed to be borne by shareholders and creditors, instead of using taxpayers' money to bail-out. The
early termination rights include contractual acceleration, termination and other close-out rights. 138  These
early termination rights can be stayed by the resolution authorities on the basis of maintaining a continuous
market function and achieving an effective resolution outcome. Entering into resolution will reduce the
chances of national bailout and thus avoid the conflicts in such cases.
In addition, thanks to the continuous efforts of international financial organisations, particularly the Key
Attributes, national resolution laws have been largely harmonised. In accordance with the latest FSB
report as of May 2017, 139  many jurisdictions, mostly Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs)
home jurisdictions, 140  have implemented bank resolution regimes broadly in line with the KAs, 141  and
reforms are underway in many other jurisdictions. 142  The harmonisation of national resolution laws will
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reduce obstacles resulting from the asymmetric national insolvency laws. However, despite that the conflicts
of pre-crisis bank insolvency and national bailout have been largely mitigated through the resolution
mechanism, certain conflicts still exist in terms of effective resolution from the home jurisdiction perspective
and protection of local interest from the host jurisdiction perspective.
In terms of effective resolution, it has been analysed from the economic point of view that a unitary or
universal approach towards cross-border resolution can achieve best outcome, no matter in the form of a
branch or a subsidiary. 143  This is due to the consideration of current banking operation situations where
the parent and its foreign establishments share various common business values and other infrastructure
systems such as client management, financial accounting and IT and software systems. 144  Breaking down
the group by adopting a ring-fencing or territorial approach has been criticized that it may undermine the
effectiveness of global resolution cooperation and disrupt international finance. 145  As a general conclusion
drawn by Lupo-Pasini, this kind of ‘financial nationalism’ is inefficient. 146
From a consolidated supervision perspective, the home authority has the best position to commence a
global consolidated resolution due to the function they take in the global consolidated supervision. This
mirrors the legal basis of the CIWUD in the EU. As a general rule, the ‘home country control’ principle
has been incorporated into the international banking supervision framework formulated by the BCBS,
requiring the worldwide home supervisors to conduct the consolidated supervision. 147  It started from the
Basel 1975 document ‘Report on the Supervision of Bank's Foreign Establishments’ (Basel 1975 Concordat),
which established a general rule that ‘no foreign establishment escapes supervision’ and ‘this supervision
is adequate’. 148  The 1975 Concordat was later updated by the new ‘Principles for the Supervision of
Bank's Foreign Establishments’ (Basel Concordat 1983), in which the consolidated supervision principle
is explained as ‘parent banks and parent supervisory authorities monitor the risk exposure — including a
perspective of concentrations of risk and of the quality of assets — of the banks or banking groups for which
they are responsible, as well as the adequacy of their capital, on the basis of the totality of their business
wherever conducted.’ 149  It is further supplemented by the ‘Minimum Standards for the Supervision of
International Banking Groups and their Cross-border Establishments’ (Basel 1992 Minimum Standards),
reaffirming that ‘[a]ll international banking groups and international banks should be supervised by a home
country authority that capably performs consolidated supervision’. 150  In the latest ‘Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision’ (Basel Core Principles), the home country control principle is stated in
Principle 12 as: ‘an essential element of banking supervision is that the supervisor supervises the banking
group on a consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential standards
to all aspects of the business conducted by the banking group worldwide’. 151  Home authority with
consolidated information is suitable to administer a global resolution strategy.
Nevertheless, conflicts may still exist in cross-border cases in which local interests are not adequately
protected. Two major categorizations are generalized. First, the foreign establishments are not covered
by the home resolution regime. Sometimes the home authority simply excludes foreign establishments
from its national resolution regime, which raises the concern in cross-border resolution that only home
interest is taken into account while no foreign host interest is considered. 152  A particular case is where the
establishment in the host jurisdiction is not systemically important. Resolution measures must go through
the public test and can only be imposed on systemically important institutions. 153  Thus in the case of a
small foreign establishment, the home authority would not take resolution actions on the host establishment
and the host authority needs to take action on its own, usually under other insolvency proceedings. Another
case might also occur in the presence of an independent subsidiary, where only the subsidiary experiences
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financial difficulties but the parent is in good condition. Thus, the home authority has no incentive to enter
into resolution. Under such circumstance, it is up to the sole discretion of the host authority to exercise
resolution measures.
Second, and more commonly, the foreign establishments are covered in the home authority measures but
the measures cannot effectively protect the local interest or even undermine the local interest. This also
includes several situations. The first one is that the home authority does not have efficient resolution powers.
Despite that resolution regimes have been implemented in many jurisdictions, there are other jurisdictions,
for instance, Canada and China, do not have enough resolution powers for resolution authorities. 154  In
such circumstance, the home authority cannot exercise effective resolution on the domestic entities, let alone
foreign establishments. The second circumstance is that the home entities are not systemically important
in the home jurisdiction but the foreign establishments are systemically important in the host jurisdiction.
Under such circumstance, the home entity may only enter into traditional bank insolvency proceedings
including reorganisation and liquidation, while the financial stability of host jurisdiction might not be well
protected under such proceedings. A third circumstance is that there are legal conflicts between home and
host jurisdictions. Although harmonisation has been achieved in some jurisdictions, there is still unsolved
discrepancies, in both resolution and insolvency laws. An example is the asymmetry bail-in tools in the
different jurisdictions, resulted from the fragmented national insolvency laws which to a large extent bind
the exercise of bail-in. 155  This follows the traditional conflicts in the international insolvency law. Under
the above-mentioned circumstances, there is also a necessity to balance the local interests.
4.2. Home main resolution proceeding and host secondary resolution proceeding
To balance the conflicts of interest of effective resolution and protection of local interests, it is proposed in
this paper that a modified universalism approach should be adopted, both to branches and subsidiaries. In
this part, the mechanism regarding branches is first discussed.
In terms of branches, it is believed that the FSB has already shown a preference for modified
universalism. 156  Despite that the choice is not explicitly stated in the document, the Key Attributes
emphasize that the host authority should have resolution powers over the local branches, to either support
a home resolution proceeding, or to take measures on its own ‘where the home jurisdiction is not taking
action or acts in a manner that does not take sufficient account of the need to preserve the local jurisdiction's
financial stability’. 157  It is inferred from this sentence that the main task of the host authority is to act as
a supportive authority, unless in the exceptional cases, i.e. lack of resolution instructions from the home
authority or insufficient consideration of the host's local financial stability, it could take measures on its
own. Such a supportive role of host authorities in turn confirms the leading role of home authorities. It is
proposed that, the home authority should make resolution decisions for both the home parent institution
and host branches. And when certain conditions are met, the host authority can open a secondary resolution
proceeding, either an independent proceeding or a supportive proceeding.
As a general rule set above, the branch, together with its parent, should both be subject to the home
main resolution proceeding, which ensures the resolution action formulated by the home authority would
not be impaired by the unilateral action of the host authority. For instance, upon recognizing foreign
home proceeding, certain relief should be granted in the host jurisdiction, similar to those prescribed in
the UNCITRAL Model Law, such as stay of ‘commencement or continuation of individual actions or
individual proceedings concerning the debtor's assets, rights, obligations or liabilities’, stay of ‘execution
against the debtor's assets’ and suspension of ‘the right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of any
assets of the debtor’. 158  As explained by the FSB, staying creditor's power aim to ‘avoid distribution of
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the bank's assets in a manner inconsistent with resolution strategy and the priority of payments’. 159  Such
relief serves the same function as facilitating the global resolution strategy developed by the home resolution
authority on a worldwide basis.
After recognition of the home resolution proceeding, the host authorities can continue to determine to open
a follow-up secondary proceeding if necessary. The first type of secondary proceeding is the supportive
proceeding, in which the host resolution authorities can take actions following the request of the home
resolution authorities to implement home resolution measures in the host jurisdictions. According to the
FSB ‘Principles for Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions’, supportive measures ‘involve the
taking of resolution (or other) measures by the relevant domestic authorities, in the context of domestic
resolution proceedings or supervisory action, to produce the effect of, or otherwise support, the resolution
action taken by the foreign resolution authority.’ 160  In the cross-border corporate insolvency cases,
sometimes ‘the insolvency estate of the debtor is too complex to administer as a unit’, 161  thus a secondary
proceeding is needed. This might also be true in the cross-border resolution cases. For instance, in the
EU, to give effect to the foreign resolution measures, the host authorities in the Member States might
need to exercise the resolution powers in relation to rights and liabilities of a foreign institution's Union
branch, 162  including the power to suspend certain obligations, the power to restrict the enforcement of
security interest and the power to temporarily suspend termination rights. 163  The supportive proceeding is
different from simply enforcement of foreign resolution measures, as supportive action ‘might be conditional
on the commencement of domestic resolution proceedings and the resolution authority would be limited to
the measures that are available under the domestic regime’. 164  For instance, in Singapore, the Monetary
Authority of Singapore (MAS) has powers to transfer the business or shares, to restructure share capital,
or to bail-in in order to give effect to foreign resolution, but the action has to be consistent with domestic
procedural requirements. 165  In other words, the domestic supportive proceeding should be in line with the
general domestic legal framework. A general rule is that in the supportive secondary resolution proceeding,
the host authority takes a supportive role and the host resolution proceeding shall be subordinated to the
home main resolution proceeding, with the aim to give effect to the global resolution action decided by the
home authority.
The second type is the independent secondary resolution proceeding. According to the BRRD, the Union
branch is subject to the foreign jurisdiction, unless ‘a Union branch is not subject to any third-country
resolution proceedings or that is subject to third-country proceedings and one of the circumstances referred
to in Article 95 applies’. 166  Article 95 lists 5 circumstances where the EU resolution authorities can refuse
to recognize or enforce third-country resolution proceedings. 167  In addition, it is required that taking an
independent action needs to meet the public interest test and one or more of the following conditions:
 (i) the Union branch no longer meets, or is likely not to meet, the conditions imposed by national law for
its authorisation and operation within that Member State and there is no prospect that any private
sector, supervisory or relevant third-country action would restore the branch to compliance or prevent
failure in a reasonable timeframe;
 (ii) the third-country institution is, in the opinion of the resolution authority, unable or unwilling, or is
likely to be unable, to pay its obligations to Union creditors, or obligations that have been created
or booked through the branch, as they fall due and the resolution authority is satisfied that no third-
country resolution proceedings or insolvency proceedings have been or will be initiated in relation to
that third-country institution in a reasonable timeframe;
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 (iii) the relevant third-country authority has initiated third-country resolution proceedings in relation to
the third-country institution, or has notified to the resolution authority its intention to initiate such
a proceeding. 168
Taken all these provisions into consideration, an independent action 169  can only be taken when (i) the
host authority has known or has sufficient reasons to believe that there would be no home resolution
proceedings or the home resolution proceedings would not be made in time, or (ii) the home authority has
made resolution decisions or at least has notified the host authority the intention to do so but the host
authority determines that the measures would be against the local interest. This implies the pre-condition of
a non-satisfying home resolution proceeding for commencing this independent host resolution proceeding.
If a home resolution proceeding is commenced and made to the host jurisdiction in time and does not violate
the local public policies, the host authority has an obligation to follow the resolution proceeding in the home
jurisdiction. The opening of independent resolution proceedings is subject to the status of home resolution
proceedings, and therefore considered to be a secondary proceeding subordinated to the main proceeding
in the home jurisdictions.
Additional remarks are made regarding two other situations. First, the home authority does not have
resolution powers under its domestic law or it does not have the intention to commence resolution
proceedings for the parent institution, instead, the home authority opens a traditional reorganisation or
liquidation proceeding to address both the parent and the foreign branch, the host authority would have
sufficient reasons to believe that there would be no resolution proceeding on the local branch. Under the
cross-border corporate insolvency regimes such as those prescribed in the UNCITRAL Model Law or the
EIR, the host authority would recognize the home main proceeding with the possibility of opening a local
proceeding. If the resolution law has been enacted in the host jurisdiction, the host authority should also
be able to open an independent resolution proceeding if the host authority deems it necessary to protect
the local interest. Second, the home authority does commence a resolution proceeding on the home parent
institution but not foreign branches, the host authority would face the same situation as there would be no
resolution proceeding on the branches. Under this situation, the host authority has to determine on its own
how to solve the branch, either in the traditional reorganisation or liquidation proceedings or in the special
resolution proceedings according to the national laws in the host jurisdiction.
In short, in the parent-branch resolution, the home parent authorities are empowered to open main
resolution proceedings as a general principle, though it does not rule out the possibility that the host branch
authorities can open secondary resolution proceedings. Without the presence of conflict of interest, the
secondary resolution proceeding shall be a supportive one. The host authority can also open an independent
proceeding in exceptional circumstances, i.e. there is no home main resolution proceeding covering foreign
branches, or it causes conflict of interests against the local policies.
5. Group Resolution Issues
5.1. The need for a group resolution action
Unlike branches, subsidiaries are independent legal entities incorporated in the host jurisdictions, and
subject to the sole resolution of host authorities. For instance, the BRRD explicitly requires that subsidiaries
of third-country groups are enterprises established in the Union and therefore are fully subject to the Union
law. 170  Regarding the conflicts of effective resolution and protection of local interest, the current regime
is adequate in the latter but insufficient regarding the former. In the US, the new legislation has even
required the FBOs with a significant US presence to establish intermediate holding companies over the US
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subsidiaries as a fear that a foreign firm ‘may not have sufficient resources to provide support to all parts
of organisation’. 171  This requirement ensures effective control over ailing subsidiaries in the US. In this
part, more analysis is conducted regarding effective resolution, i.e. extending home resolution powers to
host subsidiaries and forming a group (parent-subsidiary) resolution action.
Apart from the above-mentioned reasons in Chapter 4, discussions have been ongoing regarding the
specific parent-subsidiary structure. Generally from the intra-group funding perspective, separating group
components might undermine the efficient resources allocation within the group and hamper cross-border
capital flow and investment. 172  On the subsidiary side, the territorialism approach would isolate foreign
subsidiaries from the parent and other parts of the group, also from the possible financial funding from other
group members; 173  from the parent side, the separation of a subsidiary would reduce the possible financial
support from that subsidiary, as well as essential services provided by that subsidiary. 174  In addition,
implementation is also a major problem resulting from the ‘unrealistic assumption of clear asset segregation’
between the parent and subsidiary. 175  Consolidated financial report reduces the group company's incentive
to clearly divide assets among the group members. And such unclear division of the assets between the parent
and the subsidiaries on the basis of the modern group operation model might lead to severe consequences in
the time of crisis. As demonstrated by the Lehman Brothers case, the holding company was managing the
group's cash centrally and thus caused liquidity problem at the subsidiary level after the holding company
entered into bankruptcy proceedings. 176  Lack of an orderly group resolution strategy would severely
damage the effectiveness of resolution.
In addition, as mentioned above, both branches and subsidiaries are subject to the consolidated supervision
of the home authority. It would be inefficient and ineffective to exclude the consolidated supervisor from the
resolution of the subsidiary, who has the consolidated information on the group as a whole. 177  Moreover,
the imbalances of resolution regimes in different jurisdictions may provide incentives for global financial
institutions to conduct such ‘resolution jurisdiction shopping’, similar to forum shopping, transferring assets
or establishing subsidiaries in the jurisdictions where resolution tools such as bail-in are lacking. 178
As highlighted by Gleeson, ‘the value which [resolution authorities] are trying to preserve resides in the
economic ‘firm’ and not the legal entities.’ 179  Legal structure shall not be the main obstacle for the effective
global resolution regime. The following discussion shows several attempts to overcome or circumvent the
legal obstacles.
5.2. International Practices
5.2.1. Soft law instruments
At the global level, several attempts have been made to solve group resolution issues, including soft law
instruments, Crisis Management Group (CMG), supranational authority, and single point entry (SPE) and
multiple points of entry (MPE). The soft law instruments can take various forms, such as institution-specific
cross-border cooperation agreements, Memorandums of Understandings (MOUs) and protocols, aiming
to strengthen the cooperation among home and host authorities.
The institution-specific agreement was proposed in the Key Attributes as a coping mechanism specifically
targeted at Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs). 180  In these agreements, the
roles and responsibilities of the authorities should be defined, and home and host authorities commitments
with regard to cooperation shall also be specified. 181  As the word ‘commitment’ indicates, the requirements
Cross-border Resolution of Financial Institutions:..., 27 No. 5 J. Bankr. L....
 © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 17
imposed on home and host authorities are not legally binding and there are no legal consequences for not
abiding by the agreement.
MOU is another common agreement signed between the home and host authorities, which, unfortunately,
is also one type of soft laws and not legally binding. An example is the MOU reached by the FDIC and
Bank of England (BOE) on resolution issues. 182  The purpose of this MOU is to facilitate the exchange of
information and cooperation, and it only expresses the authorities' intent and does not ‘create any legally
binding obligations, confer any rights, or supersede domestic laws’. 183
A third form of soft law instruments is Protocol. This is used in the Lehman Brothers Case. 184  As the same
issue identified in the institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements and MOUs, the protocol
is not legally binding. As stated explicitly in the Lehman Protocol, it ‘shall not be legally enforceable nor
impose on Official Representative any duties or obligations’. 185
A major concern for these soft law instruments is the enforceability issues, as they are non-binding
agreements. 186  In addition, these cooperation mechanisms do not address the conflict of home and host
jurisdictions thus cannot provide an effective solution for group resolution.
5.2.2. Crisis Management Group (CMG) and resolution colleges
Crisis Management Group (CMG) is proposed by the FSB, consisting of home and key host authorities,
‘with the objective of enhancing preparedness for, and facilitating the management of resolution, a cross-
border financial crisis affecting the firm.’ 187  CMGs are mainly responsible for: (i) ‘progress in coordination
and information sharing within the CMGs and with host authorities that are not represented in the
CMGs’; (ii) ‘the recovery and resolution planning process for G-SIFIs under institution-specific cooperation
agreements’; and (iii) ‘the resolvability of G-SIFIs’. 188  According to the description of the tasks and
responsibilities, CMGs are actually a coordination mechanism without substantive power on the decision
or implementation of the resolution measures. In addition, the CMGs are only established for the G-SIFIs
while other domestic or regional SIFIs are left uncoordinated.
Coordination mechanism is enhanced through the resolution college requirement prescribed in the
EUBRRD, including resolution colleges and European resolution colleges. A resolution college is
established during the resolution of a group of Union institutions, while a European resolution college is
established in the case where a third country institution or third country parent undertaking has Union
subsidiaries established in two or more Member States, or two or more Union branches that are regarded
as significant by two or more Member States. 189  In addition to the tasks conducted by the CMG,
including information exchange, recovery and resolution plan, resolvability assessment, resolution colleges
are further equipped with additional functions like ‘exercising powers to address or remove impediment
to the resolvability of groups’, ‘deciding on the need to establish a group resolution scheme’, ‘reaching
the agreement on a group resolution scheme’, ‘coordinating public communication of group resolution
strategies and schemes, and ‘coordinating the use of financing arrangement’. 190  As such, through resolution
colleges, group resolution action is possible to be reached.
Nevertheless, the resolution college mechanism only provides a ‘platform facilitating decision-making by
national authorities’, but a resolution college per se is not ‘a decision-making body’. 191  The resolution
authorities participating in the resolution colleges do not have to be bound by the decisions made in the
resolution colleges, and any dissent resolution authority can depart from the group resolution action as
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long as the authority submits detailed reasons. 192  Criticisms on such resolution college instrument also
include lengthy procedure and unpredicted outcome, 193  as well as incompetent function in terms of assets
located outside the jurisdiction of the participating authorities in the resolution college. 194  In particular,
the conflicts between home and host authorities are not well addressed within the resolution college. 195
This is simply a procedural coordination mechanism similar to the group coordination proceeding regulated
in the EIR. In fact, national authorities on the subsidiary level can still act independently and there is no
rule for the consolidated authority to conduct consolidated resolution.
5.2.3. Supranational authority
The most effective way towards cross-border group resolution probably is by establishing a supranational
resolution authority. Proposal for a ‘global sheriff’ has been made such as a Word Financial Organisation
(WFO). 196  However, such supranational authority is extremely difficult to achieve at the global level and
the international financial standard setters are mainly soft-law regulators. 197  At the regional level, the
consensus might be easier to achieve, exemplified by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) in Europe. The
successful establishment of the SRB is attributed to the long endeavour towards European harmonisation
of banking and financial law, and, in particular, the recent establishment of the Banking Union.
Subsequent to the Euro Area crisis in 2010/11, the EU leaders decided to create a banking union where EU-
wide rules apply to banks in the Euro Area and any non-Euro Member States that would want to join. 198
A new regulatory framework was set out with a ‘single rule book’, consisting mainly of the prudential
requirements for credit institutions as prescribed in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), as well as the rules for recovery and resolution as those in the
BRRD, and the rules of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive. 199
Prudential supervision was also largely harmonised within the Banking Union, introducing the so-called
‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM). 200  This SSM empowers the European Central Bank (ECB) to act
as the ultimate prudential supervisor, directly supervising 124 significant supervised entities as of 1 April
2017, and indirectly supervising less significant institutions through national competent authorities. 201  In
addition, the SRMR established the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), creating uniform resolution
rules that can be directly applicable to credit institutions in the Banking Union. Within the SRM, the
SRB acts as the resolution authority for the entities and groups directly supervised by the ECB and other
cross-border groups. 202  The SRM is interconnected with the Banking Union and the SSM and possible
future harmonised deposit guarantee schemes, on the foundation of the political union and internal market
in Europe. It does circumvent conflicts of home and host jurisdictions by establishing a supranational
authority to address cross-border resolution issues. Inspite of the effectiveness, the supranational authority
model is highly doubtful to be established at the global level.
5.2.4. Single point of entry and multiple points of entry
Another mechanism for financial institution resolution relates to two competing strategies: single point
of entry (SPE) and multiple points of entry (MPE). According to the FSB, SPE refers to the model that
‘resolution powers are applied to the top of a group by a single national resolution authority’; while
MPE refers to the situation where ‘resolution tools are applied to different parts of the group by two or
more resolution authorities’. 203  The application of SPE or MPE is not restricted to cross-border groups.
Domestic financial groups can also apply SPE or MPE strategies as long as they have a holding/parent-
subsidiary structure.
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The FDIC explicitly expressed its preference for an SPE strategy. 204  Accordingly, the FDIC would enter
into resolution at and only at the parent level, without interfering with the daily operation of subsidiaries, no
matter domestic or foreign. The SPE strategy is also reflected in the FDIC-BOE joint paper. 205  The choice
is compatible with the holding company structure in the US. 206  Under the holding company structure, the
holding company is the parent company without significant trading operations, thus the resolution of the
parent company alone can preserve the operating subsidiaries as a going-concern. However, SPE might not
be a viable solution in jurisdictions where the parent companies are operating entities, like in many EU
Member States. 207  As such, the EU explicitly allows both SPE and MPE. 208
In the cases of cross-border group resolution, the conflict of SPE and MPE resembles the conflict of
universalism and territorialism. Application of SPE only requires the resolution action of the home
authority, while under MPE strategy, the home and host authorities can both exercise resolution powers.
The universal effect of SPE must be based on the foundation of successful loss absorbing at the holding
parent level. If the holding company can absorb the group losses, there is no need for the subsidiary to enter
into resolution, thus there is no incentive for the host authority to exercise resolution powers. As a result,
the outcome is that only the home authority exercises resolution powers and creates a universal effect.
However, SPE does not directly address the conflict of home and host authorities, though it provides an
ideal solution for avoiding such conflicts. Sometimes the conflicts are unavoidable. In cases where the loss
of the subsidiary is too much to be covered by the parent, resolution at the subsidiary level is inevitable. 209
Also, in the operating parent model, application of an SPE strategy might not be feasible as it will undermine
the orderly resolution of the parent. Actually, in accordance with the FSB TLAC requirement, both the
parent and subsidiary have to prepare to absorb losses. 210  This indicates, at least implicitly, the scepticism
about the effectiveness of SPE and the possibility of MPE. MPE is the simple replica of current practices of
resolving group members in accordance with their legal nature, i.e. the subsidiaries are subject to the host
resolution proceedings. As a result, MPE does not provide an effective solution for group resolution.
In short, none of the above approaches directly address the conflict of home and host authorities in the
group resolution proceedings. Some might successfully circumvent or avoid such conflict, but none of them
provide a direct solution.
5.3. Head office functions test
An attempt is made in this paper to find a legal basis for the home authority to take actions against foreign
subsidiaries, overriding the common company law principle that a subsidiary is an independent legal entity.
A possible solution is inspired by the corporate insolvency cases in which foreign subsidiaries could be
subject to the same main insolvency proceeding as the parent. The ‘head office functions test’ is applied
here. If subsidiaries, as part of the group, could be deemed as ‘establishment’ of the parent company, in the
cases where the parent company functions as a head office and effectively controls the subsidiaries thus the
home jurisdiction could be deemed as ‘COMI’. 211
In the corporate insolvency cases, in order to make the COMI-establishment rule apply to the parent-
subsidiary situation, two premises need to be satisfied: (i) the COMI of the subsidiary should be where the
parent is located; (ii) the subsidiary is deemed as an establishment of the parent. First, the second premise is
examined, namely, how to correctly understand the word ‘establishment’. In accordance with the EIR 2015
Recast, ‘establishment’ is defined as ‘any place of operations where a debtor carries out or has carried out
in the 3-month period prior to the request to open main insolvency proceedings a non-transitory economic
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activity with human means and assets’. 212  It has to be interpreted as: (i) economic; (ii) non-transitory; (iii)
carried on from a place of operations; (iv) using the debtor's assets and human agents. 213  Thus, for instance,
the presence alone of goods in isolation or bank accounts does not constitute as an establishment. 214  A
specific question regarding subsidiary is whether an establishment cannot be an independent legal entity.
In the Burgo Group Case, it is stated that
there is no reference in the definition in Article 2(h) of [EIR] to the place of the registered office
of a debtor company or to the legal status of the place in which the operations in question are
carried out. The wording of that provision does not therefore rule out the possibility that, for
the purposes of that provision, an establishment may possess legal personality and be situated
in the Member State where that company has its registered office, provided that it meets the
criteria set out in that provision. 215
In other words, independent legal entities such as subsidiaries can be treated as establishments as long as
the criteria listed above are satisfied.
The question related to the first premise can be illustrated as whether the COMI of a subsidiary is where
the parent company is. COMI is stipulated in the EIR 2015 Recast as ‘the place where the debtor conducts
the administration of its main interests on a regular basis and which is ascertainable by third parties.’ 216
The requirement is that the COMI must be both objective and ascertainable by third parties, ‘in order to
ensure legal certainty and foreseeability’. 217  It is further regulated that ‘[i]n the case of a company or a
legal person, the place of the registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in
the absence of proof to the contrary. That presumption shall only apply if the registered office has not
been moved to another Member State within the 3-month period prior to the request for the opening of
insolvency proceedings.’ 218  According to this article, unless rebutted, the COMI of a subsidiary should be
the host jurisdiction where the subsidiary is registered. However, it is also acknowledged that it does not
exclude the possibility that the COMI of the subsidiary is where the parent is. The is usually conducted
through the ‘head office functions test’. 219
The head office functions test is generally believed to be on the basis of the Virgós-Schmit Report, in which
it is stated that
Where companies and legal persons are concerned … unless proved to the contrary, that
the debtor's centre of main interests is the place of his registered office. This place normally
corresponds to the debtor's head office (emphasis added). 220
In the Diasytek Case, the court found that even though three German companies are registered in Germany,
the COMI is actually in the parent location the UK (Bradford). 221  Several similar decisions can be seen
in the national judgments. 222
The head office functions test is criticized because of the overlook of the ascertainability element since the
third parties may still have difficulty identifying the head office of the debtor, 223  which does not meet the
requirement of ‘COMI’ as ‘ascertainable by third parties’. 224  But it should also be noted that the head office
functions test does not simply equal COMI as head office. The emphasis is on the ‘function’ it takes. It is
explained in the Interedil case that the COMI should have management and supervision function. 225  While
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the presence of head office alone cannot lead to the decision of head office COMI. The COMI has to take
the role of a central administration. For example, in the Eurofood case, it is determined that the COMI of
an Italian company's subsidiary in Ireland is located in its registered jurisdiction Ireland. 226  It is held that
where a company carries on its business in the territory of the Member State where its registered
office is situated, the mere fact that its economic choices are or can be controlled by a parent
company in another Member State is not enough to rebut the presumption laid down by [EU
Insolvency] Regulation. 227
This paper does not intend to discuss the reasonableness of this head office functions test. In fact, there is
no need to discuss the COMI/establish element with regard to financial institutions since the whole basis
is about home/host relationship as identified in the Chapter 3. Instead, this head office functions test here
provides a possible theory that a group entity managed and administered through a central head office
could be resolved on a group basis.
It is held that this kind of head office functions test could be applied in the cross-border resolution cases. If a
parent institution does conduct a central administration head office function, and it is of the best interest for
the authorities to take a consolidated resolution, the head office functions test can provide the legal basis for
such substantive consolidation of different local proceedings, thus removes the legal obstacles. However,
this paper does not advocate an absolute universal resolution proceeding. In situations that parent does
not take the head office function and the group entities are operated in a decentralised way, there is no
incentive to consolidate different proceedings. Economic tests show that the more decentralised a global
bank's activities, the greater the relative advantage of MPE resolution, i.e. resolution at both the parent
and subsidiary level. 228  For large global financial institutions, it might not be possible to apply this head
office functions test as different subsidiaries are decentralised operated. Furthermore, even though the head
office functions test is successfully applied in the cross-border resolution, it does not exclude the possibility
of opening a secondary proceeding in the host jurisdiction. This kind of secondary proceeding can either be
a supportive proceeding, or an independent proceeding as those in the parent-branch resolution.
A possible application of such head office functions test in the cross-border resolution is the regional
consolidation situation. Where a parent institution in jurisdiction A has a subsidiary in the host jurisdiction
B, and this subsidiary has another subsidiary in another host jurisdiction C, it is possible that the host
jurisdiction B can be the regional head office, and thus the resolution of the regional group members can
be exercised by the resolution authority B alone. This may help reduce the complexity of resolving the large
global institutions in the way that cooperation and coordination only need to be achieved between A and
B instead of among A, B and C.
Concerns about the application of such head office functions test might be the ultimate decision body and
actual implementation problems. It is not the intention of this paper to further discuss the feasibility of
applying such theory. As emphasized above, this paper only provides a possible legal basis to address the
conflicts in the cross-border resolution cases. However, it is proposed here that the head office functions test
might be put forward by either the home or host authority, and then submitted for discussion in the CMG
or resolution colleges, in which a majority consensus among the participating resolution colleges is needed
to execute the main resolution proceeding and any dissent authorities can choose to commence secondary
independent proceedings.
6. Concluding Remarks
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Mervyn King said in his frequently cited quote that banks are ‘global in life and national in death’. 229
Thanks to the efforts towards the harmonisation of global resolution regimes, it can be concluded that the
post-crisis financial institutions are moving forward to global in death as well. Still, unsolved problems
remain in the cross-border resolution, particularly, the jurisdiction rule with regard to the competent
authority that can commence resolution proceedings. As inspired by the international corporate insolvency
law, in order to balance the conflict of interests between effective global resolution and protection of local
interest, modified universalism approach should be applied to the cross-border resolution. Regarding the
power allocation between home and host authorities, to achieve an effective global resolution, the home
authority should take the leading role in the global resolution action; while the host authority can also
enjoy certain autonomy when protection of local interest is necessary. In the parent-branch resolution, the
home resolution authority should be alone to commence the main resolution proceeding, while the host
authority might open a supportive secondary resolution proceeding or an independent secondary resolution
proceeding in the meanwhile. In the case of parent-subsidiary structure, in spite of the general rule that
the host authority is empowered to open the resolution proceeding for the subsidiary, it should be possible
to allow the home authority to initiate a global resolution action as the main resolution proceeding while
the other proceedings in the host jurisdictions are secondary proceedings. A likely legal basis for such
determination is the head office functions test developed in the international corporate insolvency law.
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